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Civil anarchizing for the common good: 
Culturally patterned politics of legitimacy in the climate justice movement.  
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This article presents an ethnographic study of the case of Ende Gelände (EG), a German civil 
disobedience network undertaking action for climate justice. We reveal how a politics of 
legitimacy in civil society organizations such as EG are structured and constructed through 
different styles of civic action. Specifically, in our case study, a dominant pattern of ‘civil 
anarchizing’ (CA) emerged, in which legitimacy was continuously negotiated in relation to 
both external and internal stakeholders. This CA style was also accompanied by a more 
individual-centered style that we call personalized politics (PP). We compare both styles and 
describe the tensions that  result from their co-occurrence. In addition, we argue that the CA 
style might be more viable for politicization due to its emphasis on a collective strategy. 
Finally, we describe how this CA style shaped the participants’ politics of legitimacy by 
functioning as a negotiated hybrid of civil and uncivil expectations. 
Keywords: civic action, legitimacy, climate justice, activism, ethnography 
 
Introduction. CSOs: From essentially good to essentially contested. 
The environment has increasingly come under threat over recent decades. However, it seems 
that the more we talk about sustainability, the less sustainable we become. Despite the 
emergence of a green consciousness, responses to environmental problems are increasingly 
disputed. Climate change has emerged as one of the most contentious issues. While mainstream 
policy often looks at climate change as a technical issue of measuring and managing CO2 
emissions, the climate justice movement (CJM) considers the state of our climate within a social 
justice framework (Hulme, 2009, pp. 842-843). The CJM argues that climate change is 
intertwined with an unequal distribution of environmental benefits and risks. Climate change  
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disproportionally affects underprivileged groups such as the world’s poor who are least 
responsible in producing it. Therefore, a radical reduction of greenhouse gasses would be 
necessary yet insufficient to address this ‘wicked problem’. The CJM demands a democratic 
and just transformation towards a climate neutral society within planetary boundaries 
(Martinez-Alier et al., 2014). More specifically, the CJM advocates a strategy of 
(re)politicization of the climate challenge that aims to “leave fossil fuels in the ground” 
(ClimateJusticeAction, 2017; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). By invoking imaginaries of alternative 
futures (Verschraegen & Vandermoere, 2017) and different conceptions of citizenship 
(Dobson, 2003), as well as by engaging in disruptive actions such as occupations and blockades, 
the CJM enacts a radical social struggle aimed to fundamentally transform contemporary fossil-
fuel-based capitalism (Martinez-Alier, Temper, Del Bene, & Scheidel, 2016). As the CJM calls 
on citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) to take the future into their own hands, it 
embodies a contested form of civic action aiming to delegitimize more mainstream and 
“depoliticized” versions of climate action and “going green” (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). 
Theoretically, the CJM exemplifies the potential of CSOs to advocate highly different 
imaginaries of the “common good” (Frantz & Fuchs, 2014). Indeed, the advancement of 
sustainable and common interests is an essentially contested issue (Swyngedouw, 2014). Neo-
institutionalists consider civil society as a habitat in which organizations define and defend their 
own versions of the common good (Reuter, Wijkström, & Meyer, 2014). CSOs need to 
legitimate themselves and gain support from different stakeholders. This includes both 
members and external parties such as political institutions or funding sources. However, the 
exact organizational and interactional mechanisms through which legitimacy is negotiated 
remain little understood. 
Against this background, we present a case study of Ende Gelände (EG, German for “Until here 
and no further”), a European network involved in mass civil disobedience for climate justice. 
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EG presents itself as a broad network of people from the anti-nuclear and anti-coal movements, 
who share the belief that civic action is needed in order to stop climate change (EndeGelände, 
2016a). Our case study focuses on the network’s operations in spring 2016, during which it 
brought together approximately 3500 people to occupy an open-pit lignite (brown coal) mine 
and its infrastructure over three days, closing down its extractive work. EG represents a current 
CJM undertaking a contested form of climate action. 
Although the EG event took place in the German Lausitz region, its significance reaches beyond 
it due to international participation, global attention paid to subsequent similar eventsa and 
being a major example of the growing “blockadia” and environmental justice movements 
(Owen, Rivin, Cardoso, Brototi, & del Bene, 2017; Temper, Del Bene, & Martinez-Alier, 
2015). It is, therefore, a pre-eminent case that allows us to study how CSOs negotiate legitimacy 
in their everyday work. Using the civic action approach developed by the American sociologists 
Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014), culturally patterned politics of legitimacy emerged from our 
data. We reveal how EG’s dominant cultural style of civil anarchizing and a subordinate style 
of personalized politics shaped the multiple organizational and interactional modalities 
employed by the participants to negotiate legitimacy. 
Below, we first outline our theoretical approach to the study of the culturally patterned politics 
of legitimacy. Against the broader background of neo-institutionalist insights into the 
structuring impact of legitimacy expectations, we adopt a micro-sociological and performative 
perspective through the civic action approach (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014). Subsequently, 
we introduce our empirical case and methodology. We then present our findings on emergent 
styles of civic action and the tensions between them. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of our findings for scholarly interest into the ongoing legitimacy work of CSOs. 
In search of legitimacy: From structure to process.  
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Traditionally, it has been argued that CSOs arise in response to both political and market 
failures, and by default enjoy legitimacy by addressing the common good. Due to the prevailing 
emphasis on the civil sphere as distinct from political-economic institutions, the differences and 
potential conflict between and within CSOs have been overlooked. It is, however, crucial to 
recognize and scrutinize the continual struggle for legitimacy faced by CSOs – a legitimacy 
which must be gained and regained, in relation to both external and internal stakeholders. For 
example, Chambers and Kopstein (2001) noted that civil society encompasses a continuum of 
legitimate and illegitimate actors and visions, ranging from the WWF to white supremacists. In 
this fluid space CSOs and their ideas can become hegemonic, while their positions can also 
become objects of contestation (Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier, 2013).  
In other words, the civil sphere can be considered  an arena where CSOs struggle for legitimacy. 
They may legitimize themselves by trying to alter dominant expectations, or more simply by 
conforming to standard norms and isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this 
vein, neo-institutional theorists have emphasized that organizations are largely guided by 
institutional rules and norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). They elucidate the structuring impact of 
social conventions, thereby considering institutionalized expectations as equivalent to legal 
constraints (McKinley, Zhao, & Rust, 2000), or scripts to be followed (Binder, 2007). 
This classic top-down approach to structural legitimacy does not investigate how the scripts of 
this apparently “good” and “appropriate” organizational behavior are constructed in the first 
place. Drawing on the agency-centered research tradition of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 
1969/2012) and more recently on the notion of “inhabited institutions” (Binder, 2007), we 
acknowledge that cultural patterns do not simply infuse empty institutions with normative 
content. Rather these institutions and CSOs are comprised of people who act as creative agents 
actively making sense of their contexts.  
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While acknowledging the micro-cultural critique of neo-institutionalism, we favor a more 
balanced approach to the study of legitimacy by focusing on cultural patterns as a means to 
interact (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; Swidler, 1986). We conceptualize legitimacy as a 
perceived quality that individuals assign to an organization or event based on judgments of 
appropriateness. These judgments collectively constitute wider norms but are also subject to 
isomorphic pressures (Suddaby, Bitektine, & Haack, 2017). Looking deeper into the “structure-
agency” dialectic between macro-cultural isomorphic pressures and micro-level flexibility, 
Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) posited that publicly shared cultural repertoires indeed gain 
meaning through interpretation and interaction in social contexts. However, the exact way these 
collective repertoires are enacted depends on the style of the group or scene in which they are 
found. These styles of civic action function as filters in an intermediate layer between 
institutional logics and everyday practices. By shaping participants’ expectations of “what is 
going on” and “what is good behavior in this setting”, styles provide common ground for the 
participants. Through this theoretical lens, we can see “structure happen” and shed light on how 
the politics of legitimacy in CSOs are produced and patterned (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014). 
Lichterman and Eliasoph define civic action as “action coordinated by participants to improve 
some aspect of common life in society, as they imagine society” (2014, p. 809). This definition 
rejects the classic notion that CSOs are essentially good. It shifts attention to the inherently 
contingent process through which space for civic action is created, rather than assuming it only 
occurs in a certain distinct organizational type or civil society sphere. The central research 
question thus becomes: how do actors coordinate their civic actions in certain scenes? 
Lichterman and Eliasoph adopt the concept of “styles” to illuminate the durably patterned ways 
through which participants enact civic action. These styles are “recurrent patterns of interaction 
that arise out of members’ shared assumptions about what constitutes good or adequate 
participation in the setting” (2014, pp. 813-814). Because participants using a shared style have 
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similar perceptions of what is going on and how should one behave, a style provides mutual 
ground for interaction by providing shared meanings for participants. As such, styles also 
function as “filters”, enacting and articulating more widespread cultural concepts such as “civil 
disobedience” or “loyalty” in a specific way. Civic action styles thus describe how people 
perform civic action, based on their shared assumptions.  
While Eliasoph and Lichterman first theorized these styles as “group styles” (2003), they 
recently focused on “scene styles” to align their framework more consistently with Goffman’s  
dramaturgical approach (2014, p. 815). Scenes are “strips of action” carried out by participants. 
A certain scene occurs in a specific setting if participants in the scene share assumptions about 
“what is going on”. These interpretations determine participants’ behavior. A joke, for example, 
can become an insult if the scene changes and the action is interpreted differently. Because of 
this dependency on interpretation, multiple scenes may occur within one organization, 
sometimes progressing smoothly or at other times entailing abrupt change (e.g., a meeting that 
erupts into everyday chatter on its closing, or a peaceful protest that escalates into a riot). In 
addition, participants may even have differing assumptions about an ongoing action strip. This 
implies that two scenes may be enacted simultaneously, possibly creating frictions due to 
divergent understandings of how to behave in this situation. 
Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014) delineated three heuristic dimensions of civic action styles to 
study the patterned occurrence of civic action scenes. The first dimension is an implicit and 
subjective map that depicts participants’ external reference points. The map defines ties to non-
participant actors such as the audience, allies and opponents, and to relevant concepts such as 
societal transformation. Within the map they discern whether participants highlight conflict, 
whether they envision their efforts as contributing to social transformation, or whether they 
hope to appeal to a socially diverse, universal audience. The second dimension concerns 
internal bonds which define participants’ responsibilities towards each other. Do these bonds 
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lead participants to behave uniformly as a coherent body or highlight harmonious but personal 
uniqueness, and do participants expect to have enduring or rather easily disconnected bonds. A 
third dimension revolves around speech norms that define appropriate ways of expression and 
whether speech should be strategic, personal, rational, emotional, polite, etc. 
Scene styles thus constitute cultural filters and create common grounds for civic action, based 
on what participants consider appropriate behavior depending on their interpretation of a 
setting. Below, we will apply this theoretical lens to the case of Ende Gelände to reveal the 
scene styles it employs and develop an empirical understanding of how the politics of 
legitimacy are enacted through these styles. 
Methods 
The civic action approach is embedded in the micro-cultural tradition of symbolic 
interactionism (Blumer, 1969/2012), which assumes that shared meanings provide shared 
grounds for interaction. As recommended by Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014) we took an 
ethnographic approach to gathering data on civic styles. Thereby we aimed to obtain 
congruence between the theory and our data by focusing primarily on everyday interactions, 
routines and the constant process of (re)negotiating meanings. We gathered our data from 
participant observation and from examining frequently cited documents and press materials 
available on EG’s website.  
Data collection 
The ethnographic data mainly centered on the Belgian branch of EG, whose participants and 
their interactional dynamics could be studied from the preparatory meetings onwards as well as 
in the wrap-up process in the period after the protest action. We could observe all Belgian 
participants (N=120) and had conversations with half of them. Generally, they were relatively 
younger, highly educated white people, with loose ties to green or radical left-wing 
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organizations and an activist and alter-globalization background. For many, this was their first 
experience of direct action or civil disobedience. When interacting with other nationalities, 
among whom French, German, British and Swedish participants, we did not encounter major 
differences in terms of the demography of civic activity. The participant observation phase was 
carried out over eight days and included two days of preparatory action training in two cities; 
the bus ride back and forth from Brussels to the East-German region of Lausitz; three days of 
civic action at the camp and the railway blockade; and attendance at an evaluation meeting 
facilitated by the trainers.  
During each of these ethnographic moments, the first author adopted the research role of open 
participant observation. Upon entering a research setting the ethnographer announced that he 
was a researcherb, stated his goals and gave participants a contact file providing additional 
information and guaranteeing anonymity. He participated in the action through a diversity of 
settings, representing both frontstage and backstage scenes. Such scenes included chatting 
while waiting in the food queue at the camp, being in a delegates meeting on the occupied site, 
joining a demonstration, nervously preparing for the action or informally discussing politics. In 
these scenes he had conversations with 79 participants – 59 of whom were Belgian. These 
participants included first time participants and more experienced activists, organizers, trainers, 
cooks and facilitators. While some of these conversations where short and informal, other 
interactions took up to four hours and often had a reflexive character, for instance about the role 
of the police or about horizontal organizing. Generally these conversations revealed insight in 
the assumptions participants held about maps, bonds and speech norms. Observation notes were 
guided by the heuristic dimensions of cultural styles and their accompanying sensitive questions 
(Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003, pp. 784-787; Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014, pp. 842-843). 
Being seen as both a researcher and activist, and having a similar background to most 
participants, resulted in a semi-insider position (Beech, Hibbert, MacIntosh, & McInnes, 2009; 
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Sherif, 2001). Mobilizing this position he could obtain data by functioning as a curiosum. 
Participants would for example offer unsolicited suggestions about the research, or vent their 
frustrations to the researcher as an outsider. However, being also seen as an activist enabled 
him to gain access to a setting that was wary of infiltration. To maintain some critical distance, 
his focus alternated between participants who had insider status and those who did not. 
Throughout the research process, the ethnographer gathered informant feedback to check 
emergent findings (Bryman, 2012, pp. 494-495; Schwartz-Shea, 2014, pp. 135-136). This was 
carried out in three ways. First, initial insights were discussed through informal conversations 
during the action. Secondly, a month after the participant observation, four in-depth interviews 
were carried out with Belgian participants who could be considered critical informants because 
of their reflexive stance towards the organizational process. Thirdly, after the data analysis, 
findings were presented and discussed with a group of seven trainers involved in the action. 
Engaging in several member checks at different stages of the research process allowed for 
improving the multivocality of the data (Ybema, Yanow, Wels, & Kamsteeg, 2009, pp. 8-9). In 
addition, it served as a ‘member check’ on the trustworthiness of preliminary interpretations of 
the data gathered (Creswell John & Miller, 2000, p. 127; Merriam, 1995, p. 54). Finally, having 
member checks allowed for deepening understanding and further abductive development of 
hypotheses that emerged from our field notes. 
Data treatment  
We understand that our data was coproduced by researchers, participants and the contexts in 
which it was gathered. As researchers we reconstruct and interpret perceptions, experiences and 
meanings to identify underlying patterns (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). The data analysis 
occurred in a cyclical process. After each ethnographic session field notes were transcribed 
distinguishing between descriptive, reflexive and theorizing notes. In the same sequence, the 
transcribed field notes were coded according to the heuristic dimensions of style. While 
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conflict, audience, transformation and the continuum of unity-diversity emerged as important 
dimensions, speech norms and temporality were less relevant to our data. Tentative hypotheses 
on the nature of the styles and tensions occurring between participants emerged from the coding 
process. These hypotheses functioned as an additional focus for subsequent observations and 
interviews. The interviews were transcribed from audio-recordings and analyzed in a similarly 
cyclical manner as the field notes.  
Case description 
As mentioned above, our research focused on a particular mass civil disobedience action that 
took place in 2016 (May 13-15). This specific action was framed in a global action week labeled 
“Break free from fossil fuels” and coordinated by climate NGO 350.org. By occupying the 
Welzow-Sud lignite mine and blocking transport infrastructure, Ende Gelände tried to pressure 
the Swedish owner Vattenfall and the German State to close down the lignite branch instead of 
selling it. In a broader framework the action also aimed to bring the phasing out of lignite to the 
agenda, favoring climate justice and energy grassroots democracy above fossil-fuel-based 
capitalism. The action was a publicly announced mass blockade, portraying itself as “legitimate 
but illegal”.  
Based on our fieldwork, it soon became apparent that distinct organizational characteristics 
were key to understanding the patterning of civic action in EG. First, people could only 
participate in the action if they respected the “action consensus” - a document produced through 
internal discussion - providing a fixed framework for the principles of appropriate conduct. It 
renounced escalation, destruction and physically endangering the parties involved, while 
encouraging mutual caring, creativity and diversity (EndeGelände, 2016b). The document 
asked people to participate at the personal level, not primarily as a member of another 
organization, and it also asked them to take responsibility for the proper implementation of the 
action as a whole. The action consensus thus served to create common ground for participating 
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in the occupation of the mine. During the action we found, however, that participants interpreted 
the document in various ways, leaving room for discussion but also for autonomy and divergent 
forms of participation. Nevertheless, as a regulatory tool, the action consensus was central to 
the politics of legitimacy with respect to internal and external stakeholders. 
In addition to this predetermined action framework, the main organizational structures enabling 
EG’s decentralized approach to organization were buddy pairs, affinity groups, delegates 
meetings and “the Fingers” (see Figure 1). 
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
Buddy pairs constituted the lowest level of organization and consisted of two people who 
mentally and physically look after each other during, before and after the action. Affinity 
Groups (AFGs) contained several buddy-pairs. They were small autonomous and egalitarian 
groups consisting of 4-16 people brought together by “affinity”c (McDonald, 2002; Mercier 
vega, 1983). Their task was to function as small circles of participation and caring, in theory 
enabling everyone to be involved in decision making while feeling comfortable with their role 
in the action. With a history in Spanish anarchism and direct action groups, AFGs function as 
units in a decentralized network, making a larger mass of participants more resilient and more 
difficult to control. In preparation for the action, civil disobedience trainers facilitated the 
AFG formation process through exercises that elicited participants’ personal preferences on 
how they wished to participate in the action (e.g. how much exposure to police lines they 
wanted). The Fingers were used as an organizational instrument to coordinate AFGs as they 
moved toward the mine. A Finger consists of a long column of people in rows of 4-6 that may 
consist of up to a few hundred participants. It is divided into different AFGs with varying 
functions such as carrying material, determining the route or forming the first line in case of 
encounter with the police. Because of limits on information flows – as the participants did not 
want the police to know about their specific plans – the Finger was more hierarchically 
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organized. It functioned on the basis of the participants’ trust in the “Nail” of the Finger: a 
leading group at the head of the formation that determined where it would go and in what 
manner. Thus similarly to action agreement, the Finger reflects how the autonomy of 
individuals and AFGs is embedded in predetermined organizational frameworks. 
 
While the activists occupied the mining infrastructure they coordinated themselves through 
meetings between revocable delegates. These delegates meetings occurred a few times a day, 
involving approximately 40 delegates. They were led by a facilitator and functioned as a 
platform for discussion and information flow. Both strategic and practical matters were 
discussed and proposals that gained the consensus of the delegates could be taken to the 
AFGs, who could then amend them and decide whether or not to carry them out. In contrast to 
the Finger, the delegate meetings allowed more decentralized coordination. While the setting 
of the AFG was informal, the more formal and impersonal delegate meetings generally meant 
that strategic arguments overruled personal preferences.  
Chronology – the course of the action 
Two single-day action training sessions were held beforehand in Belgium, in which 
approximately 15 participants prepared for civil disobedience under the guidance of three 
trainers, practicing organizational and tactical skills through role-playing and briefings. An 
action camp was set up close to the lignite mine, providing logistical support with field kitchens, 
composting toilets, legal and medical assistance and large tents to hold plenary meetings – and 
have parties. Visitors participated in everyday tasks and were asked to make a voluntary 
financial contribution. Upon arrival, the Belgian participants were asked to join the green Finger 
that would occupy the railroad tracks, with most of the AFGs agreeing. Two other Fingers also 
aimed to occupy the railroad tracks, while another two would attempt to enter the mine and 
another one aimed to block lignite supplies at the power plant. 
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Nerves arouse a few hours before the green Finger departed: the AFGs gathered material and 
tried to work out their role in the Finger. Around 500 people and a samba band left for the train 
tracks shouting climate justice and anti-capitalist slogans. Surprised to have encountered no 
police resistance, the group reached its destination after walking eight kilometers. They 
occupied the tracks for the next 48 hours, waiting to be evicted which did not eventuate. While 
participants played games and built plastic tent-like shelters to protect themselves from the rain, 
tactical discussions and task distribution occurred through the delegate meetings that took place 
every few hours. After lengthy discussion, the AFGs also occupied the loading cranes – called 
“the Towers” - and on the day they left, they built a “blockade monument” with scrap material. 
On the bus back to Belgium the participants gave the impression of being exhausted but 
empowered. Most of them still had dirty faces from the lignite dust as they shared their stories. 
One week later, an evaluation meeting took place involving approximately 40 of the Belgian 
participants, where they reviewed the press coverage, presented updates and discussed topics 
such as the communication structures. 
Findings 
 
The findings are reported below in four sections. First, we describe the civil anarchizing (CA) 
scene style, a term we coined to make sense of EG’s dominant interaction pattern for negotiating 
legitimacy. Then, we compare CA with a subordinate and more individual-centered style called 
personalized politics (PP). The final two sections focus on tensions that were central to the 
politics of legitimacy. On the one hand, specific tensions arose from the co-occurrence between 
the two styles. We discuss how the CA style balanced legitimacy claims to provide common 
ground for interaction. On the other hand, a particular tension between civil and uncivil scenes 
emerged from our fieldwork. Although civil and uncivil scenes occurred, the CA style shaped 




Civil anarchizing (CA) emerged as a dominant scene style from our fieldwork. The adjective 
civil, in the first instance carries, a descriptive meaning, in the “civic” sense that participants 
frame themselves as acting citizens. “Civil”, however, is also prescriptive, as participants aspire 
to appear as civilized and as worthy “good citizens” (Tilly, 2010). The verb anarchizing refers 
to participants pragmatically enacting broad anarchist principles. The inspirational role of the 
anarchist elements becomes evident in the participants’ plea for global grassroots anti-capitalist 
direct action through the affinity groups. Although the coalition’s website does not mention 
anarchism, and it is probably that a large majority of participants would not self-identify as 
such, they nevertheless enacted these principles and acted on common ground with groups 
carrying anarchist symbols on flags and banners. 
The term “civil anarchizing” thus delineates EG’s hybrid character in attempting to combine 
the civilized and civic with a radical approach and struggle reflecting broad anarchist principles. 
To further flesh out this scene style, we used two of Lichterman and Eliasoph’s (2014) heuristic 
dimensions: participants’ maps highlighting conflict and aiming for societal transformation 
while acting for a broad and general audience; and their group bonds, expressing a strategic 
unity-in-diversity.d 
If one could map the imagined positions taken by the participants in the CA style in relation to 
other actors, this map would highlight conflict. They positioned themselves on the side of 
climate justice in opposition to fossil-fuel-based capitalism; as proponents of grassroots 
democracy opposed to political elites, as activists who constitute an investment risk opposed to 
the mining company, as disobedient citizens with respect to the police; and as defending left 
wing values against reactionary right-wingers. In this self-positioning, the EG participants 
created and applied an image of the common good based on decentralization and socio-
ecological harmony. They wanted to express their disagreement with their adversaries in a civil 
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manner, while not allowing themselves to be controlled by them. As a prominent frontstage 
document that was generally endorsed, the action consensus stated:  
“We will behave in a calm and cool-headed way. Escalation will not be provoked by us. We will 
not put people in danger. We will block and occupy with our bodies, but we will not destroy or 
damage any machinery or infrastructure in the process. We will pass through or around the 
cordons and barriers set up by police and pit security, and we will not respond to provocation”   
In accordance with their system-critical positioning, participants in the CA style saw themselves 
as attempting to achieve broad and fundamental social transformation. They attempted to 
connect their struggle against lignite mining with issues such as racism, patriarchy, migration 
and capitalism. One prominent banner used by the Nail of one Finger that which widely used 
in EG’s media reports exemplifies this attempt to connect struggles. It reads “Open all borders, 
close all coalmines, end capitalism”. The participants hope to enact this transformation through 
campaign-oriented direct action and civil disobedience. 
To achieve the broad aim of societal transformation, participants hoped to appeal to a general 
audience of “ordinary people”, reachable through mass media. For this purpose, they positioned 
themselves as responsible and “normal” citizens and strategically aimed to avoid being 
marginalized. During delegates meetings, bad images and more aggressive looking tactics were 
dismissed as counter-productive. More disobedient tactics required “dressing up” to make them 
appealing or more acceptable to broad audiences. For example, white boiler suits and dust 
masks were handed out at the camp, protecting people against the lignite dust, as well as 
rendering them unrecognizable, while straw bags were carried as soft shields to push through 
police lines. 
Within their group, the participants were expected to behave in a manner reflecting “unity-in-
diversity”. Their group bonds emphasized the main strategic frameworks that were directed at 
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obtaining legitimacy from a broad audience for their social struggle. Participants coordinated 
themselves in a decentralized but collective way through the use of the action consensus, AFGs, 
delegate meetings and Fingers. Within these organizational forms, participants were expected 
to take up responsibility and behave in mutual solidarity. Moreover, visual unity was provided 
by wearing the identical white boiler suites and dust masks. A more militant AFG, fully dressed 
in black, who was discredited during the occupation of the “Towers” even asked at a delegate 
meeting whether their group could have some white suits as theirs had fell apart after 
scrambling through bushes. The delegates meeting had a charming response on the AFG’s 
request for symbolic group unity. It was pointed out that the CA group bonds did not aim at 
tight unity but strive for consensus through long deliberation and, if necessary, by agreeing to 
disagree. 
The CA style thus left room for a certain degree of autonomy and celebrated a diversity of 
expressions and participation modes. However, this autonomy and diversity had to be 
embedded within the main strategic frameworks that functioned to purposively craft the 
common ground. For example, delegates discussed for hours whether they should occupy “The 
Towers”. Some feared escalation and negative outcomes, but consensus took shape: individual 
AFGs could try to occupy the Towers, but only if they would first attempt a  dialogue with the 
security personnel, and stop if the latter were prepared to use violence. 
The CA style was especially visible in strategically focused delegates meetings. Reflecting on 
the Tower occupation, some activists were strongly opposed to the proposal to occupy it. While 
they could voice their concerns and felt these were respected, they feared an escalation in 
tensions with the workers and the loss of public legitimacy even after a compromise was crafted. 
They eventually stepped back as delegates and did not veto the proposal. Participants in the CA 
style had to negotiate between what they thought the general audience perceived as appropriate, 
what they themselves judged as legitimate, and how to weigh both against each other. In the 
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CA style, the outcome of these politics of legitimacy was that general and pre-constructed 
strategic frameworks created a common ground on which a unity-in-diversity was celebrated. 
Personalized politics 
We can contrast this dominant CA style with the more subordinate style of personalized politics 
(PP), as schematized in Table 1. The PP style is one of the six scene styles discerned by 
Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp. 842-843)e. While the CA style favored strategic unity, 
participants in the PP scenes emphasized individual-centered bonds. They highlighted the 
unique and diverse contributions of individuals that functioned harmoniously together. 
Participants loosely collaborated as individuals across different organizational forms, and 
emphasized their autonomy and personalized self-expression. In PP scenes, mass civil 
disobedience was seen as a form of self-development. Participants in the action training sessions 
for example reported that their motive to joining EG was “learning disobedience”. Being 
individual-centered, however, does not necessarily imply an egoistic outlook (McDonald, 
2002). The development and expression of their selves may be collective, as long as it is 
personalized. While similarly engaging in social conflict and hoping to appeal to a broad 
audience, the strategic organizational framework was less emphasized in PP scenes. Instead, 
they highlighted participants’ autonomy and self-expression. For example, one participant 
stated that she wanted to “live the revolution”. Moreover, the PP style aimed to achieve 
transformation through expressing and developing the self, while the CA style emphasized 
goal-oriented campaigns. PP scenes played out less frequently in delegates meetings, and more 
often in AFGs and between buddy pairs. The following field note illustrates how the need for 
personalized participation can conflict with dominant strategic frameworks. Jenny, a student in 
her 20s, expressed the need for individual-centered bonds in an informal talk after the action. 
She criticized the organization for insufficiently addressing this element of the PP style, and as 
such she expressed her expectations about the styles: 
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Jenny didn’t like the mass character and coordinated nature of the event. Although she 
trusted the coordinators in making the right decisions, she felt like a pawn, like one of 
3000 people. She would rather participate in a “qualitative” rather than “quantitative” 
way, by joining in the coordination, or performing a smaller action on the side so she 
would feel more ownership over the action. She summarized this by stating that she 
would have preferred that the coordination didn’t just need her legs [to run into the 
mine], but also her knowledge. 
While the PP style was retrieved from civic action literature, it was found insufficient to capture 
the existing politics of legitimacy in our case. Therefore we conceptualized CA as a more 
specific variation of PP. In PP scenes, the politics of legitimacy are determined by the need for 
internal legitimacy, which is based on the possibility of self-expression and self-development. 
In contrast, the CA style emphasized strategic frameworks that were constructed to ensure that 
the action appeared legitimate to an imagined broad audience.  
[***insert Table 1 about here***] 
 
We found the CA style to be dominant at Ende Gelände, while the PP style took a more 
subordinate position. The former functioned as an overarching strategic framework in which 
enclaves of the latter could exist. While these scenes could switch harmoniously, they also 
created friction when occurring simultaneously. In the following section, we elaborate on this 
friction and how it was managed. 
Tension I: Civil anarchizing versus personalized politics. 
A tension between differing conceptions of the coordinated nature of the action versus the 
assumption of horizontal organizing, and between the political instrumentality of the strategic 
framework versus self-centered activity. Participants seemed to have conflicting interpretations 
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of what constituted “the good organization”. We analytically framed these conflicts as differing 
scene styles: a dominant civil anarchizing versus subordinate personalized politics scene style. 
At certain moments, participants had differing assumptions about “what is going on” and “what 
is appropriate”. The assumption that autonomous affinity groups would work harmoniously and 
horizontally did not always fit the expectations held of the CA style. The CA style instructed 
participants to join in and contribute to the pre-structured and coordinated nature of the action. 
Both the trainings and EG’s website assumed the action’s coordination would occur 
horizontally. However, while the affinity groups were principally autonomous in their 
decisions, they usually took the default positions laid out by the coordination. A field note 
excerpt illustrates this default positioning: 
During the bus ride to Germany, most Belgian participants express the idea that they 
want to see the lignite mine during the action. Upon their arrival at the action camp, 
however, the coordination proposes that the Belgian AFGs join the green Finger and 
occupy the railroad tracks. Most of the AFGs put aside their initial preference and 
follow this laid out choice as opposed to other options, about which no info was given. 
This field note illustrates the information asymmetry between coordination positions and most 
AFGs. For example, the groups coordinating the Finger, had information on the route that they 
did not share with the wider groups, as they thought it could expose the group to heavier and 
more efficient police repression. Moreover participants who were not heavily involved in 
preparing the strategy or group formation often did not know who was involved in the 
coordinating roles at all. This was one of the major points of criticism during the Belgians’ 
evaluation in Brussels. 
The tension between the CA and PP styles also emerged in conflicting preferences for political 
instrumentality versus self-centered activity. In PP scenes, participants assumed the “centrality 
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of the self” (McDonald, 2002)f and, for example, described their engagement in the action as 
being motivated by self-development or as a way of connecting with other like-minded people. 
However, as the CA strategic frameworks shaped the common ground, this personalized 
dimension was embedded and redirected towards EG’s CA-styled mode of politicizing through 
mass civil disobedience. In CA’s strategic logic, participants are instrumental in a goal-oriented 
campaign. Recalling Jenny’s depiction of herself as a pawn, this strategic logic clearly conflicts 
with the centrality of the self. During a delegates meeting, another example of this tense 
embedding of PP scenes in the CA style was enacted. A delegates’ need for personal expression 
conflicted with the goal orientation of the decision making process: 
 
A male delegate in his late twenties who was eager to speak had been raising his hand 
for several minutes. Among the 40 other delegates, he had been neglected by the 
facilitator. When finally appointed he could raise his points. He spoke frustrated and 
voiced several concerns at once, mixing comments on the process and content of 
decision making. With the CA style expectation that delegates should bring short and 
direct arguments, and only when necessary, his breaching plea was politely ignored, 
and the decision making resumed. 
 
Participants used three strategies to deal with these tensions and keep common ground for 
interaction. First, they were encouraged to trust the organizational capacities of the coordinating 
teams. In this respect, the action experience of these teams and even the national cliché of 
efficient German organizing were mobilized. During a preparatory action training in Belgium, 
participants were debriefing an exercise on how to move through police lines:  
The group is reflecting on the role of the organizing team’s preparation of the action.  
Claire, the most experienced trainer, explains that a small group of organizers 
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determines the action’s main course, and which tactics will actually be used:  
“Participants don’t really have another option than trusting the organizing team’s 
strong framework and decent preparation”. Lucia answers that since everything seems 
well prepared she does trust the organizing team. 
In a second strategy, coordinating teams attempted to take up leadership roles in supportive and 
non-authoritarian ways. They facilitated group discussions through the delegates meetings 
rather than making all the decisions themselves. They also attempted to foster a sense of 
collective ownership and responsibility for the action. This collective ownership through unity-
in-diversity relied on continuous communication. Calm and strategy-oriented speech was 
preferred in CA scenes to reach consensus in the face of a goal-oriented campaign to shut down 
lignite mining. One example of how these group bonds and speech norms come together in 
opposition to adversaries was observed during the railroad occupation:  
A few Belgian buddie pairs were already collecting material for the “blockade 
monument” when a German AFG came over to discuss this with them. The latter 
expressed their view in a concerned and worried fashion and said that they did not want 
a blockade monument. As the conversation proceeds, the Belgian pairs assure the others 
that they have not started building the blockade monument, and say they appreciate the 
effort of the Germans to come and discuss this with them. The German delegates clearly 
calm down after this. One of them states that he considers it important not to get 
frustrated or divided. “The last thing you want is [to feel] “you want nothing to do with 
those people.” 
A third strategy consisted of a functional distinction through the “compartmentalizing” of CA 
and PP scenes at different organizational levels. On the coordination levels, such as the Finger 
coordination and delegates meetings, the CA style predominated, along with its strategic 
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outlook. Once within the CA-styled strategic frameworks, individuals and AFGs could agree to 
disagree and enjoy relative autonomy, within PP enclaves. 
By looking at how tensions are managed, we can see how the politics of legitimacy are enacted 
differently in the PP and CA scene styles. In PP scenes, participants’ legitimacy judgments lent 
more towards internal stakeholders’ diverse concerns, while the CA style seemed more outward 
looking, coordinating various efforts in a goal-oriented campaign to “Keep the coal in the 
ground”. 
While the tension between the CA and PP scenes might be primarily characterized in terms of 
participants’ different interpretations of “the good organization”, the following section deals 
with divergent assumptions about on “the right action strategy”. 
Tension II: Civil versus uncivil scenes 
Legitimacy-related tensions between civil and uncivil scenes only gradually emerged in our 
analysis. During participatory observation, tactical and strategic discussions played out on 
topics such as responses to police, the importance of public legitimacy, the strictness of the 
action consensus and conflict and escalation. More “radical” groups saw militant action as part 
of “good and determined opposition”, while more “moderate” groups understood “radical” 
action as “extremist, illegitimate and isolated”. The discussion around “Tower II” was one of 
the main examples where this tension emerged. From our field notes: 
On the second loading station, “Tower II”, the occupying groups installed barricades 
to prevent eviction by the police. Some of them joked that “Their hands were itching”, 
and asked while laughing that “Neatly dismantling the machine, isn’t violent 
destruction, right?” Later these groups put straw and sticks into parts of the machine 
to obstruct its functioning. In the delegate meeting, some participants saw this as 
damaging and as breaching the action consensus, while others framed it as “non-
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destructive sabotage”. Also, the police and mining security had expressed their 
concerns about the barriers.. A discussion ensued on how the obstruction and 
barricades might escalate the response of the police and security. Some activists were 
willing to take this on, while others did not trust the police and perceived it as a 
maneuver to create conflict between activists. 
We analyzed  this friction, and ample similar ones from our observational data, as eruptions of 
an underlying conflict between civil and uncivil scenes of action, in which participants differed 
in their perceptions of “what is going on”, and “what is appropriate behavior in this setting”. 
D'Alisa, Demaria, and Cattaneo (2013) describe “uncivil actors” as making radical demands 
and refusing to behave as hegemonic “good citizens”, in accordance with government 
expectations of them. Kaulingfreks (2015, p. 188) defined “the uncivil” as the negation of civil 
behavior. She pointed to behavior that would not fit into the social structures of society or reflect 
its approved moral codes. Both definitions entail moral and social elements and point to the 
uncivil as that which breaches norms of civility. These norms regulate conventional liberal 
democratic rule through determining what is seen as legitimate and appropriate behavior. 
Kaulingfreks also connected the idea of the uncivil with “unruly” or “ungovernable” behavior. 
By disrupting mainstream codes of appropriateness, uncivil acts contest these norms of civility 
and their respective frameworks. They can do this, for example, through civil disobedience and 
direct action or rioting. The uncivil thus carries alternative imaginaries and takes an antagonistic 
stance toward the general legitimacy of coercive State institutions such as the police.g Both 
Kaulingfreks and D’Alisa et al. emphasize the importance of the uncivil to contest and create 
space for politicization through disturbing the political or hegemonic order. We propose to 
supplement this conceptualization with the help of the performative lens of the civic action 
approach and study uncivil scenes rather than actors. As such we can see how the politics of 
legitimacy are enacted differently in these scenes. 
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In our case study, the civil and uncivil scenes usually came into conflict around the question of 
the legitimacy of the State and the police. In more civil scenes, participants put relatively more 
trust in the police behaving in a decent manner, and they aimed for public approval. Participants 
depicted mainstream norms of civility as mainly revolving around not appearing militant, not 
damaging property and overly escalating the tensions with police and workers. In these more 
civil scenes, the action consensus was interpreted as ruling out the Tower occupation or using 
more than human bodies to create blockades. In an informal conversation during the return bus 
ride, Theresa – an international participant who works as a campaigner for an environmental 
NGO – expressed her thoughts, reflecting a very “civil” map: 
Police at the “Schwarze Pumpe” power plant intervened, making arrests and using 
pepper spray when a big group of activists entered the facilities. Some participants 
responded with anti-police slogans, something Theresa strongly rejected. “The German 
police works quite well, we should be respectful. If the police don’t do what they are 
supposed to do, we would live in anarchy [in chaos].” 
In contrast to this, participants in more uncivil scenes often took an unyielding stance. They 
would praise the empowering effects of disobedience and refused to take the standpoint of the 
police into account. More generally, they would critically approach both dominant civil norms 
and the State apparatus. During the journey from the camp to the blockade, a German speaking 
affinity group in the Finger expressed this with a bold slogan: “Staat, Kapitaal, Scheisse!” 
(State, Capital, Shit!). 
The assumptions about “good and appropriate action” differ in each scene and push the politics 
of legitimacy in different directions. We can contrast uncivil imaginaries of ungovernable 
resistance with the civil scene norms of calm, open and creative civil disobedience, which is 
intended to appear as legitimate to a general audience and carried out by worthy citizens. We 
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observed both scenes being played out simultaneously in a discussion between three activists 
during the construction of the blockade monument: 
A female activist wearing a black hoodie goes over to a male buddy pair who are 
building something on the tracks resembling a deer made of metal and branches. She 
wants to spread their construction material around so the miners have more work – and 
thus higher costs. The buddies point to the group compromise [decision] for the art 
blockade that was made in a delegate meeting. They argue that it’s supposed to be 
creative because of the image [it will present] to the outside world. She tells them “Yeah, 
but we want to piss them off,” and leaves without the construction material. 
How the participants understood good strategy differed between the civil and uncivil scenes 
because of their respective politics of legitimacy: each scene weighed the internal and external 
stakeholders’ norms of appropriateness differently. While participants in uncivil scenes clearly 
contested dominant norms of “good citizenship” in the hope of politicizing them, participants 
in civil scenes were more willing to take them into account in order to appear legitimate. 
Although both civil and uncivil scenes occurred, the dominant CA scene style functioned as a 
pragmatic hybrid between them. While civil elements served to appear legitimate towards a 
general imagined audience embracing mainstream civil norms, the uncivil elements served the 
purpose of politicizing through the disruption of business as usual. In CA scenes, civil norms 
such as creativity and openness seemed acceptable, although individuals also rendered 
themselves unrecognizable by wearing dust masks and white boiler suits. They dressed up and 
organized to make themselves less able to be controlled by the police, but simultaneously 
openly announced their action. They had their own spokesperson who communicated with the 
police, and they ruled out escalation and destruction beforehand. 
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As D’Alisa and colleagues (2013) and Kaulingfreks (2015) emphasize, combining civil and 
uncivil elements can create a potent coalition. At EG, the hybridity of the CA style shaped 
common ground for contestation and being difficult to control, while legitimizing contestation 
through its civil appearance. Thus, the politics of legitimacy were shaped through the complex 
interaction between internal and external legitimacy claims. After the action, Frank a left-wing 
party militant, summarized the result of this interplay. When being asked which feeling he takes 
home from EG, he answers to have gained confidence from the action. “That activists do radical 
stuff, isn’t that new, but now a lot of ‘ordinary’ people joined.” 
One can derive the dominant front stage character of the CA style from the responses provoked 
by particular civil or uncivil scenes that did not fit into CA’s strategic framework. They were 
either met with open resistance, or were tolerated through “compartmentalization”, which 
meant they happened backstage in less visible settings (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003, p. 772). 
In addition to the mass civil disobedience action, a legal demonstration was also organized for 
people unable or unwilling to take the legal risk. However this civil action scene was far less 
prominent in media reports. Moreover, nuanced comments on the role of the police, or appraisal 
of some their interventions, were only observed in backstage settings such as interviews or 
informal talks. When participants in civil scenes made critical remarks about the dominant CA 
style, their claims were met with resistance. For example, a criticism of the  blockade monument 
by German delegate who considered it too radical and militant was quickly ridiculed and 
resisted by other delegates who had a more positive interpretation of the interventions. They 
claimed that “It’s not a blockade, it’s a collection of their [the mining company] trash,” and 
“Occupying a railroad for two days, that’s radical.” 




In contrast, an uncivil scene at the railroad tracks did not receive this treatment because it took 
place backstage and did not threaten the action’s legitimacy with respect to the general 
audience. 
The last 300 occupiers leave the railroad heading toward the action camp in a 
demonstration, making a last show of force. At the rear of the demonstration, some 
groups gather, seemingly spontaneously, and drag scrap concrete, old sleepers and 
dead trees onto the tracks covering a few hundred meters, in order to further delay the 
lignite transport. 
The participants in this uncivil scene did not engage in open consensus decision-making 
beforehand, and had they done so, a lively discussion would no doubt have ensued. 
Nevertheless, this uncivil scene seemed to be largely tolerated because, from the CA 
perspective, it did not threaten internal group bonds, or EG’s broader strategic goals due to its 
invisibility to the general audience. 
By negotiating a common ground for social interaction, in which participants hope to politicize 
the public understanding of lignite mining, the CA style shaped the politics of legitimacy at 
Ende Gelände. Holding a coalition together through diverse interpretations of what constitutes 
“good participation” and “good strategy”, it is through the embedding and hybridization of these 
differences within a unity-in-diversity approach that civic actors could engage collectively for 
the contemporary common good of climate justice. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Civil society organizations should not be studied as homogeneous entities under the unifying 
logic of the civil sphere. Rather, the civil sphere should be seen as an arena where heterogeneous 
actors compete for legitimacy in their respective contexts, both in and between CSOs. We 
studied these politics of legitimacy at Ende Gelände (EG), a highly visible European mass 
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action network involved in civil disobedience for climate justice. Taking a performative 
approach (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014), our study revealed two scene styles of civic action 
that shaped the politics of legitimacy both among the participants and in their external relations.  
Based on our in-depth analysis of participants’ assumptions about what is going on and what is 
appropriate conduct in a specific setting, we conceptualized the dominant scene style as civil 
anarchizing (CA). This scene style acted as a strategic framework providing common ground 
for interaction. The CA map, depicting external relations, emphasized socio-ecological conflict 
and societal transformation and also took into account a general civic audience. In relation to 
each other, participants in CA scenes highlighted their “unity-in-diversity,” celebrating 
differences as long as they did not threaten the common strategic ground provided by pre-
constructed frameworks such as the action consensus. 
A second, subordinate scene style called personalized politics (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014, 
p. 846) also became apparent. This style highlights participants’ personalized bonds and their 
self-expression and self-development. While the presence of the two scene styles generated 
tensions due to diverging expectations, generally the CA style succeeded in overcoming these 
by embedding personalized politics in the CA strategic framework. A second tension between 
civil and uncivil scenes, concerning competing understandings of “the good citizen”, was dealt 
with in similar fashion through the construction of a tension-containing hybrid strategic 
framework. 
Through the CA scene style, EG aimed to politicize the public understanding of sustainability 
by contesting vested interests, dominant norms of civility and hegemonic visions on the 
common good (D'Alisa et al., 2013; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 1992; Rasmussen & 
Brown, 2002). It did so by bringing the climate justice movement in conflict with lignite mining, 
emphasizing the latter’s unsustainability and occupying its infrastructure. EG undertook a 
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radical critique of fossil-fuel-based capitalism, proposing a just transformation toward an 
egalitarian climate neutral society.  
The CA style provided participants with a common ground to politicize their activities by 
enabling their coordination in a specific way. We believe that the emphasis of the CA style on 
legitimizing action before a general civil audience, without giving up the power to contest, 
constitutes a major factor in EG’s potential to politicize. The strategic synthesis of civil and 
uncivil elements in the CA style was central in this dynamic of politicizing and legitimizing. 
More civil elements, such as participants’ calm and non-destructive behavior served to avoid 
their marginalization and to legitimize their actions as those of worthy citizens. Nevertheless, 
by disobeying police orders and illegally blocking the lignite mining infrastructure, EG 
participants refused to be governed in the manner of mainstream good citizens. These uncivil 
elements enabled contestation of lignite mining while inhibiting the co-optation of the action.  
Through the synthesis of civil and uncivil elements, the CA style had a hybrid nature. In one of 
the respondents’ words, this made EG appear as “radical, but not marginal”. 
In addition to the CA style being a means for a public politics of legitimacy, it was also the 
outcome of negotiations by participants about what they perceived as legitimate. In these intra-
organizational struggles for legitimacy, participants negotiate between various positions on 
what the general audience might judge as legitimate, as well as their own different legitimacy 
judgments (Suddaby et al., 2017). This also led them to discuss how these “internal” and 
“external” legitimacy judgments should be balanced against each other. In these complex 
negotiations, the CA style became a common ground shaped by and shaping participants’ 
perceptions of legitimate conduct. For example the construction of the action consensus - a 
regulatory framework - involved intense negotiations, it structured participants’ behavior but 
was also subject to re-negotiation. In these interpretative battles, tensions occurred between 
autonomy and coordination, self-expression and strategizing, and civil and uncivil elements. 
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Participants also differed in their assumptions about how much coordination was desirable, the 
extent to which the assumed public should be taken into account and how ungovernable a good 
action should be. Civil, uncivil and personalized politics scenes occurred and contested the 
internal legitimacy of the CA style. Nevertheless these were subordinate scenes  while the CA 
style remained the dominant pattern. As such it provided a shared basis for coordinating civic 
action, defining the terms of intra-organizational debates and embedding differences within a 
common strategy. 
In emphasizing a common strategic framework that has a diversity of participation modes 
embedded in it, the CA style differs from the personalized politics style described by 
Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014). Although both styles share some dimensions, they differ in 
how they shape the politics of legitimacy. The CA style emphasizes external legitimacy in 
hybrid civil-uncivil fashion, while social interaction in the PP style is determined more by 
internal legitimacy demands, emphasizing self-expression and personal autonomy. This sheds 
a different light on Lichterman and Eliasoph’s tentative hypotheses on outcomes of scene styles.  
They state that the PP style might provide “less fertile ground for mounting and sustaining 
collective political action” (2014, p. 849). Due to the individual-centered bonds being combined 
with abstract principles, PP-scenes might face difficulties maintaining a cohesive and goal-
oriented campaign. However, we question whether this hypothesis on the PP style, is also valid 
for the CA style and propose a counter hypothesis: CA might be a more viable style for public 
politicization due to its emphasizing a collective strategy. In comparison to PP, CA seems to 
have a greater goal specificity. By compartmentalizing PP and CA scenes, the CA style at Ende 
Gelände embedded the personalized bonds of PP into an overarching strategic framework. As 
the CA style is a negotiated hybrid that aims at obtaining public legitimacy while employing 
strategic contestation, we argue that its strategic focus might counter or even override the 
negative effect of personalized bonds on campaign cohesiveness.  More comparative research 
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on these styles and their outcomes is necessary to test this hypothesis of differing outcomes of 
PP and CA. 
Based on our findings, we argue that the civic action approach allows us to grasp the 
organizational and interactional mechanisms behind the negotiation and strategic enactment of 
legitimacy with respect to internal and external stakeholders. The theoretical background of 
symbolic interactionism enables us to see how styles shape legitimacy judgments and the 
resulting processes of legitimization (Suddaby et al., 2017). While styles shape common ground 
for social interaction, they also function as filters that shape participants’ perceptions of 
appropriateness – and thus shape legitimacy judgments. Through stylized social interaction, 
patterns also emerge in participants’ maps and bonds concerning what is appropriate. Through 
this back and forth movement, styles construct, and are constructed by, social interaction. In 
addition, by providing a shared basis for interaction, styles form cultural-organizational means 
for processes of legitimization in relation to both internal and external stakeholders. 
Our analysis included organizational forms, such as the affinity group, the Finger and the action 
consensus, as the vehicles and the results of collective sense-making. Seeing organizational 
structures as “means to act” suggests they can also be studied as part of civic action styles. They 
both direct social practices, and  are enacted and reinterpreted through social practices. As such 
they also seem to be relevant to the politics of legitimacy. 
To conclude, we wish to point out a number of limitations of our study and avenues for 
further research. First, this study produced insights on civic action patterns in Ende Gelände, a 
flagship action of the wider “blockadia” and climate justice movements. Future research could 
develop a comparative approach over multiple cases. It could include critical cases in which 
the CA style might presumably be found, studies in different contexts or differing scene styles 
within the same field. Second, the relatively brief time frame of this research calls for more 
longitudinal research focused on processes of legitimation, and the evolution, distribution and 
32 
 
acceptance of scene styles. Finally, given the enormous challenges posed by climate change, 
social scientists might become more actively involved in socio-ecological change and further 
reflect upon the reinforcement of environmental justice, activism and academia.
a EG’s tactics have also been employed in other countries, for example by Code Rood in the 
Netherlands, and Limity jsme my in the Czech Republic. Although there are contextual 
differences and small innovations, the main organizational structures and cultural patterns 
seem not to be restricted to the event we observed. 
b This was not always possible in mass settings, where the researcher could not make himself 
known to all. 
c This affinity could be based on various grounds, but was usually shaped by how people wanted 
to participate in the action (e.g., take greater or lesser risks). 
d Participants’ speech norms and their temporality emerged as less important in our analysis 
and will not be dealt with here. 
e Other scene styles of civic action include: “nowtopianism”, community of interest, community 
of identity, social critics and club-style volunteers (for an in-depth discussion: see Lichterman 
and Eliasoph (2014, pp. 844-847)). 
f McDonald (2002) places this emphasis on the self within the emergence of networked social 
movements. 
g Looking further into the Gramscian framework of the integral State underlying the 
conceptualization of the uncivil by D'Alisa et al. (2013), we can examine the role of the State 
and civil society to understand how the uncivil contests both. The civil society arena and State 
can be interpreted as two sides of the same coin (D’Alisa & Kallis, 2016). In this view, States 
possess coercive power while civil society can produce hegemonic ideology through its 
normative power. As such, the winners in the civic arena can create consent with dominant 
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Figure 1:  Main organizational structures of Ende Gelände showing:  a) Affinity group consisting of same colored buddy 
pairs, b) a simplified Finger, built up of four affinity groups (blue) including the nail (orange), c) a delegates meeting 




Table 1: Civic action scene styles and politics of legitimacy at Ende Gelände.  
 Dominant scene style 
Civil anarchizing  
Subordinate scene style 
Personalized politics  
MAP   
Conflict Calm and principled conflict. Conflict as self-expression and 
self-development. 
Audience General audience. General audience. 
Transformation Systemic transformation through 
coordinated and goal oriented 
campaigns. 
Systemic transformation through 







Strategic unity, embedding relative 
diversity. 




Strategic frameworks aim for public 
legitimacy, balancing its different 
interpretations and internal calls for 
autonomy. 
Negotiating internal differences. 
Adapted from Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp 842-843).  
  
Table
Table 2:  Civil and uncivil scenes at Ende Gelände 2016. 
 Dominant scene style 
Civil anarchizing 
Subordinate scene  
Civil 
Subordinate scene  
Uncivil 
MAP    
Conflict Calm and principled 
conflict, including 
police and State. 
Open and calm conflict, 
not including police and 
State. 
Determined conflict, 




Appeal to broad 
audience as radical 
but legitimate. 
Appeal to broad audience 
as acceptable and 
legitimate. 
















Aim for legitimate 
politicizing by partly 
accepting and 
rejecting dominant 
norms of citizenship. 
Aim for public 
legitimation by accepting 
dominant norms of 
citizenship. 
Aim to politicize by 
rejecting dominant 
norms of “good 
citizenship”. 
Adapted from Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp. 842-843). 
 
